ORDER Notice of Civil Penalty No. DE 90-S206 is AFFIRMED in full for fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000), but \$2,500 is suspended provided there are no violations of Washington Water Pollution laws, Chapt. 90.48 RCW, for two years from the date of this Order. day of January, 1992. POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD ANNETTE S. McGEE, Member Attorney Member 0086B

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PCHB NO. 90-210

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PCHB NO. 90-210

VII

Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

From these Conclusions of Law, the Board enters the following:

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

(9)

read into the Washington statute at RCW 90.48.360 and .325 a requirement of knowledge. To do so would contravene the legislative intent to protect the environment.

We conclude RCW 90.48.360 and .325 are strict liability provisions and no knowledge of the release of oil is required. We conclude appellants violated these sections.

V

We now go to the question: "Is the Amount of Penalty reasonable?" RCW 90.48.144 provides for up to \$10,000 per day per violation. The penalty could have been \$30,000. The penalty is a civil one, to promote appellants' and the public's compliance.

Evidence showed that the oil reached approximately two miles downstream from the origin, and at the source point, the oil was 1/16" to 1/8" thick. It also reached three-quarters of the width of the Chehalis River.

When reviewing the amount of penalty, several factors are considered: the maximum amount possible, any environmental harm, the nature and scope of the violation, any actions taken before the penalty order issued to remedy the damage, and any past violations.

Under all the factors, we conclude the \$15,000 civil penalty is proper and should be affirmed. Since there was no past violation, some slight mitigation is merited.

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RCW 90.48.325 states in relevant part:

. . . It shall be the obligation of any person owning or having control over oil entering waters of the state in violation of RCW 90.48320 to immediately collect and remove the same. If it is not feasible to collect and remove, said person shall take all practicable actions to contain, treat, and disperse the same. The director shall prohibit or restrict the use of any chemicals or other dispersant or treatment materials proposed for use under this section whenever it appears to him that use thereof would be detrimental to the public interest.

The goal is to prevent releases to the environment. Persons are at all times to have control over the oil. RCW 90.48.320. This strict liability approach parallels other state environmental statues, e.g. State Clean Clean Air Act, Chapter 70.94 RCW and Hazardous Waste Management, Chapter 70.105 RCW. See PCHB 84-182 and 85-66, CH20, Inc. v. DOE. (Neither intent nor negligence is relevant.) Also, see R. G. Leary Construction v. DOE, PCHB 90-1; King v. PSAPCA, PCHB 88-59; and Alexis Shipping Co. v. DOE, PCHB 297.

When the statute wanted to impose a less than strict liability duty it did so in clear, unequivocal language at RCW 90.48.350.

The Washington Legislature, when it enacted RCWs 90.48.315 through 90.48.410, is presumed to be aware of the federal law. The federal law explicitly requires knowledge of the release before a duty to inform arises. 33 U.S.C. Sect. 1321(b)(5). This contrasts with Washington law.

In light of the above, it is impermissible for this Board to now

the discharge? Is the amount of the penalty reasonable?

III

RCW 90.48.320 states:

. . . It shall be unlawful, except under the circumstances hereafter described in this section, for oil to enter the waters of the state from any ship or any fixed or mobile facility or installation located offshore or onshore whether publicly or privately operated, regardless of the cause of the entry or fault of the person having control over the oil, or regardless of whether it be the result of intentional or negligent conduct, accident or other cause.

IV

Appellants contend they had no legal duty to inform DOE or contain and collect the oil because they had no knowledge of the release. We conclude this contention is without merit. In so concluding, we look at the statutes, RCWs 90.48.315 through 90.48.410, in their entirety.

The legislative intent is found at RCW 90.48.315, which states in part:

. . The legislature finds that oil spills can cause significant damage to the environment and natural resources held in trust by and for the people of this state.

RCW 90.48.360 states in relevant part:

. . . It shall be the duty of any person discharging oil or otherwise causing, permitting, or allowing the same to enter the waters of the state, unless the discharge or entry was expressly authorized by the department prior thereto or authorized by operation of law under RCW 90.48.200, to immediately notify the department at its office in Olympia or a regional office thereof, of such discharge or entry.

1	Analytical method used in the Laboratory include GC/FID	
2	(Carbon-hydrogen) and GC/FPD (chromatographable sulfur bearing	
3	compounds). Exhibits R-2, R-6 and R-7.	
4	VIII	
5	No evidence was presented of damaged birds or fish. The oil	
6	sheen thinned out quickly because of tide and current conditions.	
7	IX	
8	There is no evidence that the crew knew of the oil spill prior to	
9	DOE's appearance at the ship. They had not reported it or instituted	
10	a cleanup.	
11	x	
12	Any Conclusion of Law hereinafter recited which should be a	
13	Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.	
14	From these Findings of Fact, the Pollution Control Hearings Board	
15	comes to these:	
16	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW	
17	I	
18	The Board has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject	
19	matter of this review. Chapters 43.21B and 90.48 RCW.	
20	II	
21	The questions at issue are: If the discharge was unknown to	
22	appellants, did they violate RCW 90.48.360 by not notifying DOE of the	
23	spill? Did they violate RCW 90.48.325 by not containing or collecting	
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25		
26	FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,	
27	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PCHB NO. 90-210 (5)	

Warren borrowed a small boat and went out on the river to investigate further. He observed oil about one mile downstream and about 500 yards upstream. The oil was about one-sixteenth of an inch to one-eight of an inch (1/16" to 1/8") in the water at mid-point of the ship, but thinnned out at the downstream one mile point. He took samples at the one-mile point and about mid-point of the ship, where he found the spill to be thicker on the water, in the proximity of the Rio Madeira.

Warren and Osweiler continued to survey the river and area. They investigated other possible sources including storm drains and at the edge of the shoreline up and down the river. They found no other likely source that would have caused the oil sheen.

VI

Warren then boarded the Rio Madeira and explained what he was doing. Communication was difficult because the ship had non-English speaking crew members. He explained to the captain the best he could, and the captain cooperated and escorted him around the ship. Warren saw the safeguard control valve in the bilge was chained and locked. He also took samples from the bilge.

VII

The samples from the bilge and the Chehalis River were sent to the Manchester Laboratory for comparative analysis. The analysis confirmed a match between the River samples and the vessel's bilge.

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FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PCHB NO. 90-210

Rio Madeira had not discharged the oil. However, if it had, the release of oil was not known to the appellants. Therefore, there was no duty to collect it and to inform the DOE.

At the hearing on the merits, after testimony was heard and evidence was admitted, appellants stipulated the discharge came from the M/V Madeira. Argument reflects that violation of RCW 90.48.320 is no longer contested. We now recite the facts on the discharge.

IV

On February 2, 1990, the Rio Madeira berthed at Terminal 4, Aberdeen, WA. On the following day the Rio Madeira took on bunker fuel between 11:10 a.m. and 5:20 p.m. On February 7, 1990, the Rio Madeira moved to the Weyerhaeuser-Cosmopolis berth.

On or about February 9, 1990, DOE officials received a report from the Grays Harbor County Division of Emergency Management of an oil sheen on the Chehalis River in the vicinity of the Weyerhaeuser-Cosmopolis docks.

v

On February 9, 1990, at approximately 7:15 p.m., Robert Warren and Mike Osweller of the DOE responded to the report and conducted an investigation.

Upon arrival at the Weyerhaeuser-Cosmopolis dock's edge, Warren and Osweiler observed the reported oil sheen. The odor of oil gave a burning sensation to their eyes and nose, as diesel does. was visible in width about three-fourths of the way across the River.

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Opening statements were made. Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits were admitted and examined. Written closing argument was filed. From the testimony, exhibits and arguments of the parties, the Board makes these:

FINDINGS OF FACT

I

Appellants Dimond & Co., 4555 S. Columbia Center, Seattle,
Washington served as agents for the Nakano Line in Japan. Nakano had
chartered a shipping vessel, the M/V Rio Madeira, from Zodiac Maritime
Agencies, London, England, who in turn had chartered from Lepta
Shipping Co., Monrovia, Liberia. The ship's master was from Glenhawk
Maritime Limited, also of Monrovia, Liberia.

The M/V Rio Madeira, a foreign shipping vessel, was berthed at Weyerhaeuser's Cosmopolis berth in the Chehalis River, a water of the State, near the Aberdeen-Cosmopolis area in early February, 1990.

II

The DOE issued a Notice of Civil Penalty No. DE 90-S206, for fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000) for alleged discharges of oil from the R/V Madeira into State waters in violation of RCW 90.48.320; for failure to collect and remove the oil after entry into the waters, RCW 90.48.325; and for failure to notify the DOE of the discharge, RCW 90.48.360.

III

The timely appeal, filed on November 91, 1991, asserted that the

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1 BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON 2 ZODIAC MARITIME AGENCIES, LTD., LEPTA SHIPPING CO., LTD., and 3 WILLIAMS DIMOND & CO., 4 PCHB No. 90-210 Appellants, 5 ٧. 6 FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT AND ORDER 7 OF ECOLOGY, 8 Respondent. 9

A formal hearing on an appeal to review a fifteen thousand (\$15,000) Department of Ecology (DOE) civil penalty assessed upon appellants for allegedly causing or permitting an oil spill was held by the Pollution Control Hearings Board, on October 23, 1991, at Lacey, WA. Presiding for the Board was Annette S. McGee, with Attorney Board Member Judith A. Bendor and Chairman Harold S. Zimmerman in attendance. The adjudication concluded on November 15, 1991, when written closing arguments were filed.

Appellants Williams Dimond & Co., Zodiac Maritime Agencies, Ltd., and Lepta Shipping Co., Ltd. were represented by Attorney Andrew J. Garger (Bogle & Gates, Seattle, WA). Respondent DOE was represented by Assistant Attorney General Rebecca A. Vandergriff. The proceedings were recorded by Randi R. Hamilton, Court Reporter, Gene Barker and Associates, (Olympia, WA).

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